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THE STATUS OF MINING LOCATIONS IN WASHINGTON
By EDWARD F MEDLEYO
The growing importance of the mining industry in the State
of Washington calls for a consideration of the decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the State as to the status of mining locations in
the State. Are mining locations on unpatented land, the fee of
which remains in the Federal government, real or personal prop-
erty ?
The questions involved in considering the problem are many
and various. Would property descend as real estate or be dis-
tributed as personal property in the case of the death of the owner ?
Does our statute requiring brokers' agreements for the sale of real
estate to be in writing apply to mining locations? What is the
proper form of transfer of a mining location? Do mining claims
come within the terms "lands, tenements and hereditaments"
What is the status of buildings and other structures on mining
claims, which on ordinary land would become fixtures? Should
the interest of the owner of a mining claim be attached as real or
personal property 9
Before entering upon a discussion of the law in this state it
might be well to say that the general rule is that such an interest
is real property Judge Lindley says, "as between the locator and
everyone else save the proprietor, the estate acquired by a per-
fected mining location possesses all the attributes of a title in fee,
and so long as the requirements of law with reference to continued
development are satisfied, the character of the tenure remains that
of a fee" The proprietor referred to is the United States.
Various decisions of the mining states are collected in support
of the following statement appearing in Corpus Jurs 2 "A mining
location perfected under the law is property in the highest sense
of that term, it may be bought and sold or otherwise disposed of,
and which passes by descent, is subject to taxation, and to sale on
execution, and may be mortgaged. It is real property, and as such
is subject to a judgment lien, but no dower right attaches thereto"
The cases cited in support of the proposition come from the highest
courts of the following jurisdictions United States, Alaska, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Dakota, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Utah, and British Columbia. It should be noted here that no
Washington cases are cited.
* Of the Seattle Bar.
'Lindley on Mines (3rd Ed. 1914), § 539.
2 40 Corpus Juris, Mines and Minerals, p. 815, § 236.
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In Corpus Juris3 the statement is made, "but after the location
has in fact been made and the mining claim has been perfected, it
is real property and an oral agreement for the sale or conveyance
of it, or interest thereto, is not binding" Also it says, "a mine
itself is real estate and an interest therein can be transferred only
by compliance with the Statute of Frauds."
It should be noted that for the purpose of this discussion we
are referring only to mninmg claims which are located on the public
domain, the fee in which is in the United States. It is significant,
therefore, that the Supreme Court of the United States has uni-
formly adopted the general rule that the interest of a mining
locator, before patent issued to his location, is real property 4 It
would seem that in view of the underlying fee in the Federal
government the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States would be the ones which a state supreme court would con-
sider more than any others in passing on this question.
Our own court in the early case of Phoenz Mining and Milling
Company v. Scott5 followed a course diametrically opposed to the
majority view, holding that the possessory right which the locator
of a mining claim has is not such an interest as will support the
lien of a general judgment under our judgment lien law," making
such judgment a lien upon "the real estate of any judgment
debtor" No cases from the Supreme Court of the United States
are cited in support of the conclusion reached by the court, but
an Iowa case is cited, the following language of which is apparently
adopted as the reason for the decision. "by the language, 'real
estate of the person,' we understand that the fee simple or estate
of inheritance must be in the person in order to have the judgment
against him operate as a lieu upon the land"
The Phoenzx case is cited as authority for the decision in Huff-
man v. Ellen Minsng Company7 which holds that the sale of an un-
patented mining location under execution as personal property is
valid. The court says, referring to the Phoenix case "In that
ease we held that the possessory right which the person acquired by
the location of a mining clain under the statutes of the United
States, is not such an interest as will support the lien of a general
'27 Corpus Juris, Frauds, Statute of, p. 203.
'Bradfordi v. Morrmson, 212 U. S. 389, 29 Sup. Ct. 349, 53 L. Ed. 564
(1909).
r 20 Wash. 48, 54 Pae. 777 (1898).
6 Rem. Rev. Stat., § 445.
' 118 Wash. 546, 204 Pac. 197 (1922).
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judgment within the meaning of our code, making such a judg-
ment a lien upon 'the real estate of the judgment debtor' If this
be the rule, it would seem necessarily to follow that the interest
acquired is personal rather than real, and being personal, it could
be sold" The court goes on to state that it was not necessary to
base its judgment on the theory that the miinng claim was personal
property and finds justification for its decision on another theory
so that the force of the ruling is weakened somewhat.
These are the only two cases which seem to hold directly that a
mining location is personal property It is the theory of this article
that the effect of these decisions is greatly weakened by numerous
other decisions of our Supreme Court which can be construed only
as holding that the interest of a mining locator in his claim is real
property There are a number of cases where conflicting interests
in unpatented mining claims are settled in actions to quiet title.
While it is true that under our statutes one can bring an action to
quiet title to personal property, yet, in the cases cited, nearly
every sentence and paragraph employs language indicating that
the court, in reaching its decision, considers the action one to quiet
title to real estate. It talks about deeds to the property, convey-
ances, and throughout uses language which irresistably leads one
to the conclusion that while not so holding directly, it is basing its
judgment on the theory that the interest of the mining locator is
real property For example, in Fisher v. Jackson," the court says.
"Appellant claimed the right to possession of the land under a
mining location. This action was brought under § 785, Reming-
ton's Compiled Statutes, relating to actions for the possession and
quieting of title to real property "9
In five eases10 the action is one in the nature of ejectment, which
would lie where real estate is involved. The case of State v. Prauz1
120 Wash. 107, 206 Pac. 929 (1922).
Cedar Canyon v. Yarwood, 27 Wash. 271, 67 Pac. 749, 91 Am. St. Rep.
841 (1902) Prospectors Dev. Co. v. Brook, 32 Wash. 315, 73 Pac. 376(1903) Lauman v. Hoofer 37 Wash. 382, 79 Pac. 953 (1905) Protective
Min Co. v. Forest, et al, 51 Wash. 743, 99 Pac. 1033 (1909) Quilp, et al,
v. Republic Mines, 96 Wash. 439, 176 Pac. 57 (1917) Oroville, et al, v.
Rayburn, 104 Wash. 137, 176 Pac. 14 (1918) Kirkpatrick v. Curtiss, 138
Wash. 333, 244 Pac. 571 (1926) Karnes v. Flint, 153 Wash. 225, 279 Pac.
728 (1929) and Olympw Mang. M. Co. v. Downng, 156 Wash. 686, 287
Pac. 872 (1930).
1 Davis v. Dennts, 43 Wash. 54, 85 Pac. 1079 (1906) National M. & H.
Co. v. Pictolo, 54 Wash. 617, 104 Pac. 128 (1909) Sexton v. Wash. M. & M.
Co., 55 Wash. 380, 104 Pac. 614 (1909) Spokane, Portland v. Larson, 71
Wash. 301, 128 Pac. 641 (1912) and Gold Creek, et al, v. Perry, 94 Wash.
624, 162 Pac. 996 (1917).
57 Wash. 198, 106 Pac. 763 (1910).
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is a crimiinal action for trespass to land, involving trespassing on a
miming location and no question was raised that a mning location
might be personal property
The case of Group v. DeMoss'2 was an action to establish a re-
sulting trust in favor of the plaintiff in certain nnmng claims.
The action was based on an oral agreement and in finding for the
defendant the court said: "The evidence as to whether there was
any agreement between the appellant and the respondent DeMoss
touching the taking up of the option, was in sharp conflict. If
there was any, it was an oral agreement and relating to an interest
to be acquired in real estate. Standing alone, it was, therefore,
unenforceable under.the Statute of Frauds." This would seem to
be a direct holding that the interest of the mining locator in his
claim is real property It is perhaps unfortunate that the court
made no reference to, the Phoenix, case in its decision, but the
court's ruling has the support of the overwhelming weight of
authority in the courts of last resort in the mining states and also
in the Federal courts. Our court also has ruled that the title to 'a
mning claim may be established under the doctrine of adverse
possession.1 3 It certainly must be admitted that under our laws
the doctrine of adverse possession is one which applies to real estate
disputes, and in ruling as it has, the court has called the interest of
the mining locator in his claim real property as effectively as if it
had used that exact term in describing it.
In the two cases of Raybur v. Stewart-Calvert Company,'4 the
court discusses a lease of an unpatented mining claim using lan-
guage which makes it apparent that it considers the interest of
the locator to be real property The second of these cases is a real
action and no point is raised by the court that the action would
not lie because mining claims are personal property
Our statutes have classified the interests of the locator in mining
claims for the purpose of taxation as personal property " Judge
Lindley in his standard -work on Mines'e says. "Each state may
determine for itself the nature or character of actions which may
be maintained in its courts for the redress of private wrongs, and
"78 Wash. 128, 138 Pac. 671 (1914).
110 Wash. 120, 188 Pac. 27 (1920).
105 Wash. 570, 178 Pac. 454 (1919) and 105 Wash. 575, 178 Pao. 455
(1919).
2Rem. Rev. Stat., § 11109, which defines personal property for the pur-
pose of taxation as including all improvements upon lands, the fee of
which is still vested in the United States.
"Lindley on Mines (3rd Ed. 1914), 1205, § 539.
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may in this behalf, and perhaps others, classify interests in real
property as chattels or chattels real, or declare that a given privi-
lege exercised with reference to land shall not be classified as an
interest in real estate for the purpose of either litigation or taxa-
tion. But this does not, as we understand it, militate against the
dignity of the estate in unpatented mining claims accorded by the
decisions of all the courts, state and federal, from the beginning."
On this subject of classification attention might be called to our
statute,17 "the term 'real property' shall include every estate, in-
terest and right in lands, tenements, hereditaments, corporeal or
incorporeal." While this is a criminal statute, it illustrates what
Judge Lindley has been quoted as saying regarding classification in
affecting the real character of the property We see in this state
the same thing classified as personal property for another purpose
in a different statute. It would be conceded that under the defini-
tion of real property in the criminal statute quoted, a mining
claim would be real property and this is supported by the case of
State v. Praul.1'8
Attacking the view of the Phoenix case that a judgment lien
does not attach to a mining claim, attention is called to the case of
Bradford v. Morrtson construing an Arizona statute similar to
the Washington judgment lien statute wherein the Supreme Court
of the United States distinctly holds that the interest of a mining
locator in an unpatented mining claim is subject to the lien of a
docketed judgment. It is of interest in this connection to note that
the appellant, who lost in the Supreme Court, cited the Pwenx
case from this state in his brief. As was said heretofore, the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in a matter such
as this should be of controlling force as the fee is in the United
States.
In this connection it is pertinent to remark that the interest of
a mining locator in his claim is a higher title under the decisions of
our court than that of a conditional vendee in land under a for-
feitable contract. Yet in State ex rel. Oatey Orchard Company v.
Supersor Court20 it was distinctly held that although a conditional
vendee had no title either legal or equitable in the land subject to
a contract of sale, yet the interest of a purchaser under a forfeit-
able executory contract for the purchase of land was real property
"7Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2303 (10).
8 Supra, note 11.
R9 Supra, note 4.
2154 Wash. 10, 280 Pac. 350 (1929).
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A fortiort, the interest of a nmung locator in his claim would be
real property
To summarize, it is clear that our Supreme Court is out of line
with the great weight of authority in holding that the interest of
a nuning locator in his claim is personal property The Phoensz
case, cited as so holding, decided in 1898, appears to have been
poorly considered and without any reference to the prevailing law
of the United State Courts on the subject. All the cases cited by
the court in the Phoentz case in support of its proposition are
rulings in their respective jurisdictions that a judgment lien does
not attach to an equitable title in land. This may be the law al-
though it is open to some question in tins jurisdiction, but it cer-
tainly does not follow than an equitable title to land is personal
property There is a non sequitur here winch is the basis of the
court's ruling in the Huffman case. This latter ease, decided in
1922, cites the Phoenx without other authority and without dis-
cussion of the law in support of its ruling that the interest of a
mining locator in Ins land is personal property
On the ther hand, we have decisions in this state indicating that
mmmg claims have been treated as real property in various forms
of action. It is reasonable to conclude that if the matter were again
before the Supreme Court with the law properly digested and
briefed for its consideration, the court nght reverse itself. Other-
wise, the legislature, in order to further the development of a great
mining industry in this state, should remove all uncertainty by
passing an act adopting the reasonable and logical rule that the
interest of a mining locator in his claim before patent is real
property
